Does AlphaGo actually play Go? Concerning the State Space of Artificial
  Intelligence by Lyre, Holger
____________________________________________________________
 Does AlphaGo actually play Go?
 Concerning the State Space of Artificial Intelligence
__________________________________________________
Holger Lyre
Chair of Theoretical Philosophy &
Center for Behavioral Brain Sciences
University of Magdeburg, Germany
lyre@ovgu.de
December 2019
Abstract
The overarching  goal  of  this  paper is  to  develop a  general  model  of  the  state  space  of  AI.  Given the
breathtaking progress in AI research and technologies in recent years, such conceptual work is of substantial
theoretical interest. The present AI hype is mainly driven by the triumph of deep learning neural networks. As
the  distinguishing  feature  of  such  networks  is  the  ability  to  self-learn,  self-learning  is  identified  as  one
important dimension of the AI state space. Another main dimension lies in the possibility to go over from
specific to more general types of problems. The third main dimension is provided by semantic grounding.
Since this is a philosophically complex and controversial dimension, a larger part of the paper is devoted to
it. We take a fresh look at known foundational arguments in the philosophy of mind and cognition that are
gaining new relevance in view of the recent AI developments including the blockhead objection, the Turing
test, the symbol grounding problem, the Chinese room argument, and general use-theoretic considerations
of meaning. Finally, the AI state space, spanned by the main dimensions generalization, grounding and “self-
x-ness”, possessing self-x properties such as self-learning, is outlined.
Keywords
Artificial intelligence · Deep learning · Philosophy of mind · Semantic grounding · State space of AI · Self-x
properties
1.  Introduction
There is much to suggest that 15 March 2016 should be retrospectively regarded as a
historical date. On this day Lee Sedol, one of the strongest Go players in the world, loses
the last game of a tournament lasting several days against the AI system "AlphaGo" of the
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development company Google DeepMind. AlphaGo defeated the South Korean with 4:1
games. The event attracted worldwide attention and brought back memories of the victory
of the IBM computer program "Deep Blue" against the then reigning world chess champion
Garri Kasparov some 20 years earlier in 1997. And yet the similarity of both events is
rather superficial.
For a long time, especially in the sixties and seventies, chess was considered the testbed
and benchmark for the development of machine intelligence. In the nineties, however, not
only had this awe gone, but almost all  experts had also seen the victory of DeepBlue
coming. Even though chess has impressive combinatorics, it was obvious that sooner or
later computers would be able to calculate the decision tree more efficiently and further
ahead than any human player due to rapidly increasing computing power. DeepBlue owed
its success essentially to brute computational power, so that even its developers were very
reluctant to voice their opinions on AI's superiority over humans. AlphaGo's victory, on the
other hand, came almost out of nowhere. Just a few years earlier, computers were at best
capable of playing Go at amateur level. The complexity of Go is vastly greater than that of
chess. It is said that Go is to chess as chess is to checkers. In fact, the victory of AlphaGo
was a real surprise for large parts of the professional world.
DeepBlue and AlphaGo use radically different architectures. While DeepBlue is a classic,
symbolic and rule-based AI system, AlphaGo is based on a deep learning neural network
(DL network).  The two systems are thus paradigmatic examples of the two longstanding
and rivaling schools of symbolism and connectionism, of  "Good Old Fashioned Artificial
Intelligence" (GOFAI) and neural networks. DL networks belong to the latest development
in neural network research (see LeCun etal. 2015). They are called “deep” as they consist
of  more than just  two or  three,  sometimes even hundreds of  layers.  The breathtaking
successes of DL applications in the last ten years have led to what Sejnowski (2018) calls
the  “deep  learning revolution”.  What  makes  these  systems  special  and  what  in  fact
distinguishes virtually all neural networks since the perceptron in the late 1950s is their
ability to learn, or, even stronger and in view of the recent developments, to self-learn by
actively exploiting or exploring big training data or by self-interaction with virtual or real
environments.
There can be no doubt that the deep learning revolution has led to a new hype in AI over
the  recent  ten  years,  be  it  in  science,  industry,  economy  or  the  media.  These
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developments provide a strong motivation to rethink the question of what constrains the
evolution of AI understood as the general quest to develop thinking machines or artificial
minds. The idea of the paper is that a closer look at the deep learning revolution combined
with  a fresh look at  foundational  philosophy of mind questions in the light  of  the new
developments will guide us in our search for the dimensions that span the general state
space of AI. Hence, the ultimate goal of the paper is this: to develop and propose a model
of the state space of AI.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, the key ingredients of the deep
learning revolution that drives the advances and successes of AI over the last ten years
will  be  revisited.  The  discussion  will  provide  us  with  a  proposal  for  two  important
dimensions that span the state space of AI: self-learning and generalization. A further main
dimension consists in semantic grounding. The discussion of this philosophically complex
and controversial topic will occupy the third and largest section of the paper. We shall take
a fresh look at well-known foundational arguments in the philosophy of mind and cognition
that  are  gaining  new  relevance  in  view  of  the  recent  AI  developments  such  as  the
blockhead objection, the Turing test, the symbol grounding problem, the Chinese room
argument,  and general use-theoretic considerations of meaning. In the fourth and final
section, a general model of the state space of AI will be proposed and outlined. It shall be
argued  that  the  AI  state  space  is  spanned  by  the  main  dimensions  generalization,
grounding and self-x-ness, where grounding and self-x-ness decompose into further sub-
dimensions  (particularly  the  concept  of  self-x-ness  originates  from  the  movement  of
organic computing and includes self-learning as a special case).
2.  The Deep learning revolution
2.1  Self-learning AI
AlphaGo and  DeepBlue  use  radically  different  architectures.  In  contrast  to  DeepBlue,
AlphaGo is based on a DL network (see LeCun etal. 2015 and Schmidhuber 2015a, 2015b
for overviews). The learning-based training of the network proceeded in two steps. In its
initial  phase,  AlphaGo first  learned  patterns  and  moves  of  human Go players  from a
database of millions of moves. It was then able to give move recommendations similar to
those of experts. In a second training phase, the system learned by self-play on the basis
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of  reinforcement  learning.  This  second  phase  demonstrates  the  crucial  qualitative
difference from AlphaGo to DeepBlue: the ability to self-learn.
Classical GOFAI builds on the assumption that intelligence and cognition are nothing but
rule-based manipulations of symbols. DeepBlue is a classic AI system par excellence in
this regard. To calculate the evaluation function of millions of possible positions based on a
given starting position (on average more than 100 million positions per second) DeepBlue
relied  on  the  expert  knowledge  of  numerous chess grandmasters  implemented  in  the
calculation algorithms. As a non-learning system it  was only able to operate within the
framework of the given implementation. Such a limitation is typical for a classical GOFAI
architecture: DeepBlue was designed for one special purpose, and was therefore unable
to perform any other  task than playing chess.  It  is  a  specialized or  „narrow“  AI  (ANI:
artificial narrow intelligence).
The  more  recent  AI  development  almost  reverses  the  original  GOFAI  doctrine.  It  is
precisely the self-learn ability that opens up the field of flexible general intelligence. It is,
conversely,  rather  blocked  by  the  GOFAI  concept  of  full  rule-based  programming.  In
retrospect, it seems hard to understand how the importance of learning could have been
downplayed in the early stages of AI. Paradigmatic for this view is the position of Noam
Chomsky  (1980),  according  to  which  the  human  language  ability  is  not  otherwise
understandable  than  under  the  assumption  of  a  presupposed,  allegedly  innate  deep
grammar, i.e. a deeply anchored rule competence that is universal to humans. Chomsky
considered it out of the question that such an ability could have arisen through imitation or
reinforcement learning. Terrence Sejnowski comments on this very clearly:
“What is innate is not grammar, but the ability to learn language from experience
and to absorb the higher-order statistical properties of utterances in a rich cognitive
context.  What  Chomsky  could  not  imagine  was  that,  when  coupled  with  deep
learning of the environment and a deeply learned value function honed by a lifetime
of experience, a weak learning system like reinforcement learning can indeed give
rise to cognitive behaviors,  including language. ...it  follows logically from Orgel’s
second  rule:  evolution  is  cleverer  than  you  are,  and  that  includes  experts  like
Chomsky.” (Sejnowski 2018, S. 251)
A few more distinctions about the notion of learning are in order. Machine learning (ML) in
general is about developing algorithms to extract regularities or patterns from training data.
4
This leads to learning a function that maps an input to an output. Learning can be either
supervised, unsupervised or consist of elements of both. Reinforcement learning is the
standard example for an in-between case. Learning algorithms are said to be supervised if
both the input and the desired output are given. Backpropagation is probably the most
well-known type of a neural network algorithm for supervised learning. The idea is that the
difference between the network output  and the  supervisory  teaching signal  is  used to
backpropagate a rule for adjusting the weights of the network. Learning is unsupervised
when only the inputs are given. In this case the system has to learn to extract regularities
or  patterns  from the  input  data  in  a  self-organized manner.  Main  methods  in  ML are
principle component analysis and cluster analysis. Important types of unsupervised neural
networks are self-organizing maps such as Kohonen networks or the Willshaw-Malsburg
model. Reinforcement learning is typically considered as a third type of learning besides
supervised and unsupervised learning. Here, learning improves on the basis of feedback
in terms of reward for good performance (see the standard textbook by Sutton & Barto
2018 for an overview).
A notion of special interest that somewhat crosscuts the above distinctions is the notion of
self-learning. While it is sometimes used as synonymous to unsupervised learning, self-
learning in a more general sense should be understood as the system’s ability to exploit or
explore  the  training  data  by  itself,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  AlphaGo’s  self-play,  to  even
generate  them.  This  would  also  include most  cases of  reinforcement  learning,  as  the
learning reward presupposes that such systems actively interact with their evironments
(whether artificial or real). Demis Hassabis, co-founder and CEO of DeepMind, talks in the
same way about self-learning.1 Yann LeCun, one of the pioneers of the DL revolution,
recently proposed to distinguish the category of “self-supervised” learning from the weaker
unsupervised learning and the even weaker  reinforcement learning:  “in  self-supervised
learning, the system learns to predict parts of its input from other parts of its input”. 2 Self-
supervised learning is  thus largely  congruent  with  the general  concept  of  self-learning
introduced  here  (the  latter  comprising  not  only  self-generated  but  also  self-explored
inputs).
1 Demis Hassabis:  The Power of  Self-Learning Systems.  Talk at  MIT Center  for  Brains,  Minds,  and Machines,
March 20, 2019. URL: https://cbmm.mit.edu/news-events/events/cbmm-special-seminar-self-learning-systems
2 Yann LeCun, April 30, 2019, on Twitter https://twitter.com/ylecun/status/1123235709802905600 and Facebook 
https://www.facebook.com/722677142/posts/10155934004262143/
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2.2 Classical AI, new AI, and the three waves of connectionism
There is an interesting meaning shift in the term “AI” as it is used nowadays in connection
with the recent AI hype compared to its use over decades in large parts of the scientific
community. At least for the last 30 years of the 20th century, the term AI had mainly been
used to indicate classical AI or GOFAI. This doctrine, again, is based on the paradigm of
symbolism, i.e. the assumption that cognition is rule-based symbol manipulation. This is
mainly a software requirement, the specific hardware remains secondary, if not irrelevant.
Connectionism, on the other hand, represents an opposite paradigm, according to which
cognition is based on the interaction of a multitude of processing units with changeable,
weighted connections, specifically in terms of neural networks.  It is therefore somewhat
paradoxical that the new AI hype is mainly triggered by the success of neural network
developments such as DL.3 The new notion of AI that more and more establishes can be
seen as an umbrella term covering all major approaches that aim to develop intelligence or
cognition  in  machines or  artificial  systems.  ML,  in  turn,  is  one  of  the  new AI’s  major
subfields with artificial neural networks as a further subfield. Among neural networks, DL
networks  represent  the  latest  and  most  successful  development.  DL  architectures
comprise  various  types  of  deep  neural  networks  such  as  feedforward,  recurrent  and
convolutional neural networks (see the standard textbook by Goodfellow et al. 2016 for an
overview  as  well  as  López-Rubio  2018  and  Buckner  2018,  2019  as  first  systematic
reflections on DL in the philosophy of science and mind literature).
It  is  instructive  to  divide  the  history  of  neural  networks  or  connectionism  into  three
historical phases or waves, each interrupted by a characteristic phase of stagnation:
• 1st wave: 1950 – early 1960s. Early connectionism produces simple feedforward
networks, especially the perceptron. Its developer, Frank Rosenblatt, is the decisive
pioneer of this phase.
3 Compare a telling quote by Geoffrey Hinton (in: Ford 2018, p. 77-78): “For most of my career, there was artificial 
intelligence, which meant the logic-based idea of making intelligent systems by putting in rules that allowed them 
to process symbol strings. […] Then there was this other thing that wasn’t AI at all, and that was neural networks. 
[…] The logic-based people were interested in symbolic reasoning, whereas the neural network-based people were 
interested in learning, perception, and motor control. They’re trying to solve different problems […]
What’s happened now is that industry and government use “AI” to mean deep learning, and so you get some 
really paradoxical things. In Toronto, we’ve received a lot of money from the industry and government for setting 
up the Vector Institute, which does basic research into deep learning, but also helps the industry do deep learning 
better and educates people in deep learning. Of course, other people would like some of this money, and another 
university claimed they had more people doing AI than in Toronto and produced citation figures as evidence. That’s
because they used classical AI. They used citations of conventional AI to say they should get some of this money 
for deep learning, and so this confusion in the meaning of AI is quite serious. It would be much better if we just 
didn’t use the term ‘AI.’”
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• „Neural winter": Minsky & Papert's (1969) criticism on perceptrons was so influential
that it led to about 15 years of stagnation in the field of research and development
of  neuronal  networks.  During  this  time,  the  GOFAI  paradigm was dominant.  Its
limitations,  especially  regarding  pattern  recognition  as  an  important  practical
application, led at the end of the 1970s to the decline of this heyday of classical
symbolistic AI and thus to the end of the neural winter.4
• 2nd wave: 1980 – early 1990s. The 1980s represent a powerful return of (neo-)
connectionism  with  a  flood  of  novel  neural  network  models.  These  include,  in
particular, Hopfield networks as auto-associative memories, Boltzmann networks,
backpropagation, self-organizing feature maps (especially Kohonen networks) and
recurrent networks. And even the spiking networks appearing in the early 1990s,
although using a novel, time-dependent plasticity, belong to this phase.
• “2nd neuronal winter“: 1990 – early 2000s. The renewed decline of connectionism
in the 1990s can largely be attributed to a general problem that could well be called
the  „scaling  problem“:  neuronal  models  designed  for  a  manageable  number  of
neurons (about  10-100)  cannot  so  easily  be  scaled  up to  millions  or  billions  of
neurons without divergence problems. Another open question was whether wide
nets (with high numbers of neurons per layer) or deep nets (increase in the number
of layers) are to be preferred.
• 3rd  wave:  from  2010  onwards.  Three  factors  made  today's  third  wave  of
connectionism possible under the buzzwords "machine learning", "deep learning" or
quite simply "AI"  (see also Brockman 2019, Ford 2018,  Sejnowski  2018):  firstly,
various achievements at the end of the 2000s and beginning of  the 2010s that
made  DL  networks  mathematically  controllable  and  feasible  (cf.  Hinton  &
Salakhutdinov 2006, Krizhevsky et al.  2012),  secondly the rapid development of
computing power (such as the development of fast GPUs, i.e. graphics processors)
and thirdly the huge amount of available training data only made possible by the
Internet (this is an important point of contact between the developments of AI and
Big Data).
4 There are different notions of “winter” periods in the history of AI. In line with what was stated in the beginning of
this section, the different schools and protagonists in the history judge different periods differently. The term “AI
winter”, for instance, is often used by GOFAI proponents to indicate the decline of research funding in the second
half of the 1980s, while AI had been rather strong before. Almost the reverse is true for connectionism: while neural
network research was down in the 1970s, the 1980s brought PDP and neo-connectionism back on stage. For the
above usage of the term “neural winter” compare Sejnowski (2018, pp. 1,35) for the first neural winter and Bengio
(in: Ford 2018, p. 25) for the second.
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2.3  General AI
While AlphaGo still  relied on human expert  knowledge during its initial  training phase,
DeepMind was able to overcome this weakness just one year later with the development
of AlphaGoZero. AlphaGoZero defeated AlphaGo in 2017 with an overwhelming 100:0.
The accompanying Nature paper speaks of "Mastering the game of Go without human
knowledge" (Silver et al. 2017), because AlphaGoZero is a self-learn system from scratch
(modulo a prescription of the Go rules). For the first time ever, it was possible to create a
machine that masters a highly complex cognitive task through self-learning alone. But the
system does much more than that: AlphaGoZero masters Go on a super-human level that
leaves  the  best  human  experts  by  orders  of  magnitude  behind.  According  to  its
developers,  AlphaGoZero  had  already  reached  the  playing  strength  of  the  Lee  Sedol
version of AlphaGo after 4.9 million training games in three days of self-training.
In  addition  to  the  ability  to  self-learn  (almost)  without  a  priori  knowledge,  the  second
outstanding feature of AlphaGoZero is that it is able to acquire additional skills through
self-learning without any change in the basic architecture. Unlike DeepBlue, which is an
ANI system, AlphaGoZero's capabilities are potentially generalizable within a large domain
of  tasks.  In  December  2017,  DeepMind  introduced  the  further  developed  system
AlphaZero (Silver et al. 2017). It masters Go, Chess and Shogi on a superhuman level
after only a one-day training phase. Other recent developments in the Alpha series include
AlphaFold, a system for predicting the 3D structure of proteins, and AlphaStar, a system
mastering StarCraft II, one of the most challenging real-time strategy games in e-sports
(see deepmind.com, August 2019 release). StarCraft II is even more complex than Go and
it also demands dealing with incomplete information, and here again human top players
have  meanwhile  been  beaten.  These are  remarkable  steps  towards  General  AI  (AGI:
artificial general intelligence) – the level of machine intelligence that is equal to human
intelligence with regard to any task. AGI is thus very often considered to be equivalent to
human intelligence (HAI: human-level AI).
But of course AlphaZero is still a long way from real AGI. In particular, the specification of a
special target function, with respect to which the system then allows generalizability, is still
a  clear  limitation.  Nevertheless,  DeepMind's  developments  showed  from the  outset  a
remarkable potential  for  generating creative solutions and not  just  short-term success-
oriented strategies. For example, the 37th move in the second game by AlphaGo against
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Lee Sedol, in which the system violated a millennium-old Go wisdom, was seen by the
experts as spectacular. It not only confused the grandmaster, but also soon proved to be
crucial for AlphaGo to win the game.
A creative solution that is easier to understand but no less original is already evident in one
of the predecessor systems. DeepMind's first AI, a reinforcement learning based system
called Deep Q-Network (DQN), successfully learned to play various classic Atari computer
games (Mnih et al.  2013).  The game "breakout", for example, is about hitting a virtual
stone wall in a kind of 2D-squash-court-setting with racket and ball, and to remove a stone
with  every  wall  hit  and  score  points,  until  finally  the  whole  wall  disappears.  DQN
independently learned the tricky strategy of drilling a tunnel through the wall and pushing
the  ball  into  the  back  of  the  wall,  causing  it  to  remove  large  amounts  of  stones  (as
DeepMind founder Demis Hassabis reports, the developers did not know this trick, which
is well-known among Atari gamers; cf. Tegmark 2017, p. 122). Let us finally compare the
most important characteristics of DeepBue and AlphaZero:
System Architecture Strategy Restriction
DeepBlue GOFAI rule-based ANI
AlphaZero DL network self-learning potentially generalizable
3.  New questions in the philosophy of AI
The recent developments in AI have not yet found the full  attention from philosophy of
science and philosophy of mind and cognition that they deserve (notable and most recent
exceptions are Buckner 2018, 2019, López-Rubio 2018, Páez 2019, Schubbach 2019, and
Zednik 2019). Some of the well-know foundational arguments and considerations in these
fields of philosophy are gaining new relevance in view of the recent developments in the
third  wave  of  connectionism.  Let  us  turn  our  attention  to  these  arguments  and
considerations.
3.1  From the blockhead objection to the black box problem
Ned Block (1981) formulated an obvious objection to the Turing machine functionalism of
classic AI that became prominent under the term "blockhead". The blockhead objection
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aims at the fact that an AI program can very well show intelligent behavior without being
truly intelligent. Consider, for example, a regular conversation in a given language. It will
always get along with a maybe high, but nevertheless finite number of  sentences that
stand in logical relationships to each other. This, in principle, allows for the possibility that
a  machine system,  the  blockhead program,  is  able  to  have a  conversation  by  simply
retrieving a pre-programmed look-up table of sentences.
Block's  objection  touches  on  two  aspects.  First,  a  critique  of  a  purely  behaviorist
understanding of intelligence and cognition. Second, the question of what role the internal
structure of an intelligent system plays. Both aspects are interrelated. According to Block,
a test of cognitive abilities and intelligence based solely on external behavior, such as the
Turing test (see section 3.4), is inadequate, as there are obviously internal structures that
do not produce intelligence.
It is rather evident that the blockhead objection can be directly applied to a GOFAI system
like DeepBlue, as the system merely uses a look-up tree algorithm and built-in heuristics
based on human expert knowledge. Does DeepBlue really play chess? The question can
be denied with good reasons already on the syntactic level: DeepBlue does nothing more
than just rule-based manipulation of internal symbols. The question of whether DeepBlue
has an understanding of chess in the sense of grasping the meaning of the chess pieces
and the game as a whole  does not  even have to  be considered.  A system that  only
predicts  combinatorial  possibilities  operates even syntactically  not  like  a  human chess
player, who, due to lack of computational power, cannot heavily rely on combinatorics, but
has  to  invoke  self-learned  and  self-trained  intuition  and  heuristics  (whatever  these
psychologically vague terms exactly mean).
Applied to a self-learning, flexible system like AlphaGo, which is in part also capable of
creativity,  the  blockhead  objection  is  much  less  plausible.  It  is,  in  fact,  inappropriate
precisely to the extent that the system fulfills the condition of self-learning. DL systems in
general are largely free of programmed specifications. But what internal structures, logics
or heuristics do these systems use? At this point a novel problem arises that affects much
of the developments of the new wave of connectionism. The internal structure of AlphaGo
and related DL systems is  only  known in  outline.  This  is  a consequence of  the deep
structure and complexity  of  these systems as well  as their  ability  to self-learn. This is
known as the problem of opacity or the black box problem of deep neural networks.
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The black box problem has led to a unique and novel sub-discipline in machine learning
called Explainable AI (or XAI for short). It is driven by two motivations: on the one hand,
the developers want to understand their own systems, on the other hand, the use of DL
systems is in many areas – particularly obvious in the case of AI-based decision aids in
medicine or self-driving cars – sensitive to whether and to  what extent  one is able to
account for the question of how the systems do what they do. XAI therefore focuses, for
example, on the development of tools of visualization and analysis that allow to open the
black box and to understand the internal mechanisms of DL or related machine learning
systems  step-by-step  and  by  means  of  reverse  engineering.  In  computer  science,  a
remarkable  interest  has  emerged  to  explore  the  methodology  in  the  field  of  machine
learning and thus to practice a kind of philosophy of science.
3.2  The Symbol grounding problem
It is immediately obvious from the blockhead objection that DeepBlue doesn't really play
chess. Essentially, the system won by calculating a huge look-up tree of possible moves
with brute computational power (supplemented, of course, by effectively using a complex
evaluation function and a Grandmaster game database). By no means, however, had the
system the ability to learn. By way of contrast, for a rigorous self-learn system with black
box character like AlphaGo (or AlphaGoZero) the blockhead objection cannot be decided
so easily. The rest of this second part of the paper is devoted to the central question: Does
AlphaGo actually play Go? This question will lead us to classical topics such as the Turing
test,  the  symbol  grounding  problem,  the  Chinese  room  argument,  and  fundamental
meaning-theoretical considerations.
Let us consider DQN, as already briefly described, and its ability to play Atari breakout on
a super-human level.  As typical  for  DL systems, DQN draws on a gigantic amount of
training examples. In fact, the number of training games exceeds human training and thus
the experience of human Atari gamers by orders of magnitude. This already suggests that
the DL algorithms and network architectures do not strictly correspond to those that play a
role  in  humans.  Hence,  DL  systems  used  so  far  are  biologically  realistic  in  their
connectionist surface structure only, but not in a strict sense. But this makes them no less
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successful with regard to certain capabilities, and they can nevertheless be regarded as a
"proof of principle" for a biologically inspired connectionism.
Let's take a closer look at the training data of DQN. How can they be understood from the
perspective of the system? For a human player, breakout's block-like pixel world, despite
its minimalism, looks like a world of rackets, balls, walls and stones. There is nothing to
suggest that this is the case for DQN. The system never had contact with real rackets,
balls, walls or stones. From DQN's perspective, the only things that exist, as it were, are
tons  of  pure  pixel  distributions.  With  that  in  mind,  the  system's  superhuman  playing
abilities,  and  especially  its  additional  ability  to  develop  creative  long-term  solution
strategies  (such  as  digging  a  tunnel),  become  almost  spooky.  The  same  applies  to
AlphaGo or AlphaGoZero.
The problem can be seen as an instance of the symbol grounding problem, although this
problem, in its original form, is aimed at classical symbolism. A symbol is a physical token
that is individuated based on its physical form and that can be linked to other symbols
according  to  syntactic  rules.  Symbols  are  therefore  elements  of  symbol  systems.
Symbolism regards the manipulation of physical symbols as necessary and sufficient for
intelligence  and  cognition.  This  is  compatible  with  a  computational  theory  of  mind
according to which the brain as the carrier of cognition is to be regarded as a computer or
Turing machine. According to Stevan Harnad the symbol grounding problem consists in
the  following:  „Suppose  you  had  to  learn  Chinese  as  a  first  language  and  the  only
source ... you had was a Chinese/Chinese dictionary! … How is symbol meaning to be
grounded in something other than just more meaningless symbols? This is the symbol
grounding problem“ (Harnad 1990, p. 339-340).
In contrast to symbolism, connectionism emphasizes not only the network architecture of
cognitive  systems,  but  also  a  "subsymbolism"  instead  of  symbol-based  information
processing. Superficially,  neural networks do not operate on symbols such as Chinese
characters or zeros and ones, but on inputs that represent features. In the case of DQN or
AlphaGo, these are pixels with different gray or color values. However, since it can be
shown that important classes of neural networks such as recurrent networks are Turing
complete  (cf.  Siegelmann  &  Sontag  1995),  these  systems  ultimately  also  operate
symbolically  insofar  as  they  can  be  mapped  to  the  symbolic  operations  of  Turing
machines. The question of whether and how the input pixel distributions are meaningful for
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DQN or AlphaGo amounts to the question as to what extent these distributions have a
"grounding" or “anchoring” in the world. And superficially, it seems as if one has to say that
they  do  not  have  any  such  grounding.  Therefore,  neither  DQN nor  AlphaGo  operate
meaningfully, they do not understand what they are doing.
But  this  conclusion  falls  short  because  it  overlooks  an  important  distinction  regarding
meaning. Consider chess. How do the chess pieces get their meaning? What makes a
knight a knight? Two things: It must be different in shape from all other types of pieces,
such as rook or bishop. It then acquires its meaning in the game through exactly the role it
plays in the game, which in turn is clearly assigned to it by the rules of the game. It is
therefore a physical symbol that is manipulated according to rules – and the semantics of
this symbol originates from the syntax of the game. In contrast, consider the words of a
spoken  language.  They  allow  for  sequences  according  to  grammatical  rules  to  form
sentences. However, the question of what a particular word, such as the word "tree," refers
to, is in no way determined by the grammar. Semantics in the sense of reference does not
originate from syntax.
We must therefore distinguish between meaning in the sense of  functional role, which is
determined by internal rules, and meaning in the sense of external reference. The symbol
grounding problem primarily  asks for  meaning in  the second sense:  how can system-
internal symbols be grounded in the world so that they acquire a meaning in the sense of
reference?
Consider again the example of Atari breakout. DQN seems not to dispose of the meaning
of  the  terms racket,  ball,  etc.  in  the  sense of  reference.  However,  it  is  by  no means
excluded that  the learning performance of  DQN consists  essentially  in  the  fact  that  it
recognizes certain stable and recurring patterns in pixel distributions and links them to
regular behavior. A sufficient XAI analysis could provide exactly this kind of information, as
it would have to be shown that DQN represents stable pixel configurations in higher layers
and thus achieves the concepts racket, ball etc. in the sense of a functional role semantics
(FRS).
One  might  reasonably  assume  that,  for  the  purposes  of  significance  in the  game,
everything essential has been achieved by an FRS framework. For if we look for instance
at AlphaGo, the question of semantics in the sense of reference does not arise at all, since
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Go pieces just like chess pieces have no reference to things or states of affairs in the
world, but only an internal functional role within the system, i.e. a meaning in the game.
3.3  The Chinese room argument
Harnad's  symbol  grounding  problem was  inspired  by  Searle's  related  and  well-known
Chinese room argument (Searle 1980, 1990, cf. Harnad 1989, 2001). In a way, Harnad’s
argument  makes  the  deeper  core  of  the  Chinese  room  argument  explicit.  The  latter
argument aims to show that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, that the human brain is
not a computer in the sense of symbolism, and that the computational theory of mind is
therefore wrong. To this end, Searle conceives the Chinese room as the caricature of a
Turing machine, where he himself  takes over the role of  a tape head for reading and
writing by sitting in an otherwise empty room and by using a set of rules (the machine
table) provided to him and allowing him to manipulate Chinese characters that he obtains
in the room as input and that he reaches out as output. Since Searle doesn’t understand
Chinese and since for him Chinese symbols look like “meaningless squiggles”, he insists
that he can never attain the meaning of Chinese symbols in this way, i.e. by pure syntactic
symbol manipulation.
In the 1980s, the Chinese room argument triggered a flood of reactions and discussions,
among the most common objections to the argument are the connectionist critique (Searle
1990) and the criticisms referred to by Searle as  systems reply and  robot reply (Searle
1980). Searle basically counters all objections according to the same strategy by showing
that they just provide "more of the same". According to the systems reply the whole room
rather than the internal operator is proficient in Chinese. Searle, however, argues that he
could just as well internalize the whole room (particularly by learning the rule book) and
still  do nothing but mere syntactic symbol manipulation. According to the connectionist
variant of the systems reply we are asked to consider an entire network of operators rather
than a single operator. Searle, again, argues that we can as well imagine a “Chinese gym”
with lots of operators manipulating symbols according to rules, but that still neither any of
the operators nor the whole gym would thereby acquire the meaning of Chinese symbols.
Of particular importance is the robot reply. Would not a robot equipped with the rules of
Chinese operating in the Beijing marketplace gain the meaning of the previously merely
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syntactic symbols in the course of this interaction? Wouldn't a system in this way establish
the necessary reference-to-world relation? According to Searle, this is not the case, since
the "computer inside the robot"  (Searle 1980, 420) is still  an analogue of the Chinese
room. Be it that the input stems from an external camera and the output is used to control
the arms, on the level of the internal computer that controls the robot both input and output
still  consist of nothing but mere meaningless symbols. This answer is reminiscent of a
strange homunculus conception, and the question also arises as to whether a combination
of systems and robot reply cannot be reinforced by further arguments from the areas of
embodied and situated cognition (cf. Robbins & Aydede 2009).
But we do not need to pursue this further here. Since Searle's argument is an argument
against  GOFAI’s  symbolism  (for  Searle:  "strong  AI"),  it  merely  aims  to  show  that
meaningful thinking goes beyond algorithmic symbol manipulation. But if, in order to attain
semantics,  embodiment,  social  interaction  and  situatedness  are  crucial,  this  even
ultimately  strengthens  the  argument.  And  it  shows:  in  essence,  the  discussion  of  the
Chinese room argument boils down to the symbol grounding problem: how can meaning in
the sense of reference be grounded?
Strangely,  the technologies now available in the area of  machine language translation
through deep learning seem to realize the Chinese room scenario, at least in part. Freely
available  systems  such  as  Google  Translate  or  DeepL  have  shown  a  breathtaking
improvement in their translation performance in recent years. And yet: one would hardly
want  to  assume that  one of  these systems truly  understands the texts  they translate,
sometimes in excellent quality. The new systems go beyond earlier forms of either rule-
based or statistic-based machine translation. They extract rules of word selection, word
order  etc.  by  self-learning  on  the  basis  of  voluminous  bilingual  text  corpora.5 All  this
suggests the following: syntax is ‘almost sufficient’ to produce the linguistic behavior that
corresponds to the behavior of speakers who truly possess semantics. Although syntax is
not completely sufficient for semantics, syntax is ‘almost sufficient’ in the sense that it is
sufficient for all practical purposes (but still insufficient from a strict Searlean point of view).
This means that, in effect, a syntactic machine can be indistinguishable in its translation
performance from a human speaker.
5 A Google representative told George Dyson: "We are not scanning all those books to be read by people... We are 
scanning them to be read by an AI" (interview in Brockman 2019, p. 64).
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In  the  light  of  the  above considerations,  it  follows that  DL translation  systems do not
appear to have any relation to the world, their internal symbol processing is "ungrounded".
Nevertheless,  these  systems  acquire  rule  knowledge  and  meaning  in  an  FRS sense
through self-learning. This alone is remarkable. The crucial step, however, is yet to come.
How  can  it  even  be  possible  that  a  mere  symbol  based  FRS  becomes  effectively
indistinguishable  (i.e.  regarding  language behavior)  from a  truly  referential  semantics?
Should it be possible that, when it comes to semantics, we can do with a pure FRS alone
and dismiss any appeal to reference? On the face of it, this amazing possibility seems to
be suggested by the translation capabilities of  systems such as Google Translate and
DeepL. But on closer inspection, it’s not. The systems do indeed go beyond a pure FRS.
The text corpora used in learning create a kind of indirect world reference. They were
created by human speakers who dispose of a semantics in a referential sense. Hence,
Google Translate and DeepL have no direct but an indirect grounding, they refer indirectly
to the world. This is probably no sufficient form of reference in the sense of a genuine
causal theory of reference (following Fodor 1987; see also section 3.5), but such a theory
may be too strong in its requirements anyway. Regularities that can be extracted from text
corpora comparisons go beyond mere grammatical regularities, they also provide world
regularities  insofar  as  the  texts  deal  about  the  world.  This  allows to  extract  a  decent
amount of structural information about the world.6
3.4  The Turing test
Alan Turing's proposal to use an imitation game to operationalize intelligence has always
been  controversial.  According  to  Turing  (1950),  if  a  machine  succeeds  in  being
indistinguishable  from  a  human  being  in  its  response  to  arbitrary  questions,  then
intelligence and higher cognitive abilities should be attributed to it. Searle's Chinese room
cannot only be understood as an objection to symbolism, but also as an objection to the
Turing test (conversely, this does not mean that symbolists are committed to the Turing
test  –  symbolism  as  a  doctrine  of  cognition  and  the  Turing  test  as  an  external  test
procedure for intelligence are independent).
6 It may not allow to extract information about the intrinsicality of things in a rigorous ontological sense. According 
to the doctrine of structural realism, however, such a concept of intrinsicality is in conflict with our best knowledge 
about the bottom level and can therefore be regarded as doubtful anyway; cf. Lyre 2010.
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Numerous examples of Turing-like scenarios indicate the weakness and limitations of this
test  procedure.  Weizenbaum's  (1976)  early  experiences  with  his  well-known  imitation
program ELIZA, which was able to conduct a psychotherapeutic dialogue, are telling (and
were frightening for Weizenbaum): ELIZA was based on comparatively simple scripts and
structured  dictionaries,  yet  some  test  persons  could  not  escape  the  impression  of  a
conversation with a real psychotherapist. A more recent example is the Goostman chatbot.
It scored a surprisingly good pass on several Turing test contests in the early 2000s. The
bot simulates a 13-year-old Ukrainian boy, taking advantage of the fact that people more
easily concede grammatical mistakes and lack of general knowledge to such a personality.
These examples  show that  the  Turing  test  offers  no  sufficient  criterion  for  meaningful
cognition, since it can be passed with too simple and possibly also "dishonest" means (as,
for instance, in the form of a blockhead).
Assistance systems such as  Siri,  Cortana or  Google  Assist  provide  the  contemporary
variant  of  Turing-like  scenarios.  At  its  annual  developer  conference  I/O 2018,  Google
surprised the general  public  with  presenting Google Duplex,  a  system currently  under
development. It is meant to support everyday life, for example by making appointments for
the user. Google had tested its system in real life by scheduling a restaurant reservation or
calling a hairdresser to book an appointment. The natural-language performance of the
system is shockingly good: the called persons could not have guessed that they actually
spoke to a machine. The phone calls were fluent and spontaneous including prosodic and
non-verbal elements such as "hmm" and "uh" together with natural intonation and breaks.
This provides another example of successfully passing the Turing test, this time of a DL-
based AI.
Of  course,  the  ultimate  goal  is  to  generalize  the  Turing  test  along  the  axis  of  the
generalization capabilities of an AI system, i.e. in view of the system’s scope in problem-
solving. A Turing test for AGI would also require the system to have practical skills such as
active navigation through natural environments, producing or repairing things, or social
interaction and activities (see also the final section). Nevertheless, any Turing test remains
on the level of purely external functionality, an insight into the internal goings-on of the
black box is against the behaviorist spirit of the test. This, however, is in strong contrast to
the intuition of the blockhead objection according to which an understanding of the internal
structure  and  mechanisms  of  an  AI  system  is  indispensable  to  assign  cognitive  or
intelligent properties to it. Therefore, the Turing test should not be regarded as a sufficient
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criterion for  intelligence.  It  may still  be regarded as a necessary  criterion:  AI  systems
should perform functionally and behaviorally equivalent to humans in order to be regarded
as cognitive. Sufficient for this attribution, however, is an understanding of the relevant
internal  structure  of  the  system,  at  least  to  a  certain  extent.  To  which  extent  can
presumably not be generally said in advance, but it must at least be possible to open the
black box in part. And by this, it must then also be possible to provide information about
the systems grounding, i.e. whether and how it refers to the world.
3.5  Meaning as use and social practice
Our considerations have already led to tricky questions about the concepts of reference
and grounding. How far should one go with these questions? This depends on how far one
wants  to  build  up  one's  theory  of  meaning  primarily  as  a  referential  semantics.  The
standard  approach  in  this  domain  are  causal  theories  of  reference  (cf.  Fodor  1987).
However,  such  theories  lead  to  known  difficulties  in  connection  with  questions  of
misrepresentation.  In  short:  if  one  ties  the  meaning  or  semantic  content  of  a  mental
representation  strictly  to  its  cause,  then  by  definition  there  is  no  leeway  for
misrepresentation. This, however, sounds disquieting.
A common  approach  to  non-referential  semantics  is  provided  by  use  of  theories  of
meaning,  as  first  outlined by  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  (1953).  The central  idea is  to  trace
meaning back to linguistic use and social practice. According to Wittgenstein, the diversity
of language can be seen in the variety of ways in which it is used. The focus is on the
concept  of  rules.  A  classical,  rule-based  conception  of  language  sees  language  as
regulated by some unambiguous syntax. This applies all the more to formal languages or
mathematics  (and  has  tacitly  been  assumed  in  our  previous  considerations  on  the
relationship between syntax and semantics).  As Wittgenstein aims to show in his “rule
following” considerations, such a strict  Platonic conception of rules leads to an infinite
regress. In order to set up the syntactic rules of, say, a certain Turing machine, other rules
are  required  governing  the  former  rules.  But  these  too  satisfy  further  rules,  hence  a
regress follows.
According  to  Wittgenstein,  language is  limited by  rules,  but  these rules presuppose a
public practice and only become apparent in use. The rule following problem consists in
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the fact that language use and practice are always finite, but that no finite number of cases
determines the "rules" of language use and thus the meaning of linguistic expressions
under all, hence infinitely many, circumstances. Language rules are by no means rigid, but
depend on the social context. Wittgenstein’s bizarre thought experiment of the two-minute-
man drastically demonstrates the consequences of his conception:
„Let  us  imagine  a  god  creating  a  country  instantaneously  in  the  middle  of  the
wilderness, which exists for two minutes and is an exact reproduction of a part of
England, with everything that is going on there in two minutes. Just like those in
England, the people are pursuing a variety of occupations. Children are in school.
Some people are doing mathematics. Now let us contemplate the activity of some
human beings during these two minutes. One of these people is doing exactly what
a mathematician in England is doing, who is just doing a calculation. - Ought we to
say that this two-minute-man is calculating? Could we for example not imagine a
past  and  a  continuation  of  these  two  minutes,  which  would  make  us  call  the
process something quite different?“  (Wittgenstein 1956, VI §34)
Wittgenstein's answer is obvious: the two-minute human "does not calculate" because he
is not embedded in the practice and context of mathematics. Against this backdrop, let us
consider our guiding question whether AlphaGo actually plays Go. Games, like language,
are limited by rules. Wittgenstein insinuates a tight analogy between games and language
and between the corresponding roles of rules and rule use. Indeed, he speaks of language
as a “language game”. Just as there is no mathematics or linguistic meaning without a
social context, there are no games. Hence, from a Wittgensteinian understanding of use
and practice, AlphaGo does not play Go since it lacks social context: the shared and public
practice of the game of Go.
In  section  3.2  our  conclusion  was that  the  functional  roles  comprise  everything  that’s
essential in terms of meanings in the game. The main reason for this was that the meaning
of  moves  and  pieces  is  not  referential,  as  for  instance  chess  pieces  do  not  refer  to
anything in the world. Following Wittgenstein, however, the meaning of games still has a
kind  of  grounding,  even  if  not  in  the  referential  sense.  Instead,  it  is  a  kind  of  social
grounding. Without public practice rules of games won’t be subject to external control and,
therefore, are no rules at all.
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Wittgenstein's  reflections  on  rule  following  are  undoubtedly  radical  (and  accordingly
controversial), as the two-minute-man scenario drastically demonstrates. Saul Kripke saw
himself prompted to a radical rule skepticism, which infects not only rules of games or
language,  but  even  the  rules  of  mathematics  and  logic  (Kripke  1974).  An  in-depth
discussion  of  these questions is  far  beyond the  scope of  the  current  paper.  We shall
assume that, for all practical purposes, rule knowledge can be set up in an AI machine
modulo "Kripkensteinian" doubts.
Thus, for each version of the Alpha series, from AlphaGo to AlphaZero, the respective
rules of the games to be learned were unambiguously be implemented (Silver et al. 2017).
The machine then develops a functional role semantics about the elements and overall
setup of the game limited by these pre-determined rules. The systems of the Alpha series
have no further grounding. Google Translate or DeepL, on the other hand, already have a
rudimentary form of a socially anchored semantics, because these systems acquire an
indirect  social  grounding  in  the  course  of  their  translation  learning.  After  all,  the  text
corpora  on the  basis  of  which  the  systems learn  were  generated by  socially  situated
speakers, and are therefore parasitic with regard to their social practices. A future AI that
combines,  for  example,  the  external  performance  of  Google  Duplex  with  the  indirect
grounding of world knowledge on the basis of Internet data could ultimately become a real
part of our social practice of language and, hence, a real part of the language community.
There is no convincing reason to assume that such systems would still  lack a proper
semantic grounding.
4.  The state space of AI
The extensive discussion of the two preceding sections should now help us to achieve the
overall objective of the paper: to develop a general model of the state space of AI. Our
main question is: what are the dimensions that span this space? In section 2, the main
features of the "new AI", the third wave of connectionism, were presented. In section 3,
newly posed questions of the philosophy of AI were discussed. The central motif of the
section 2 was the ability of self-learning, the motif  of section 3 was grounding, i.e. the
semantic  anchoring  of  AI  systems  in  the  world.  This  suggests  a  first  answer  to  our
question:  self-learning and  grounding represent two essential dimensions of the AI state
space. In section 2, we also came across a third dimension: the notion of generalization
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takes into account whether an AI system is limited to a specific problem or problem class,
or  whether  it  can  be  extended  and  generalized  to  some  wider  domain  of  tasks.
Accordingly, the AI state space is to be conceived as a three-dimensional space spanned
by the dimensions:
    - Generalization (from narrow to general AI),
    - Self-learning (from rule-based to learn-based),
    - Grounding (degree of semantic world reference).
Let us locate some of the mentioned AI systems in this space (see figure 1). A classic
GOFAI system like DeepBlue is close to the origin. GOFAI systems are rule-based rather
than learn-based, and almost all of them are narrow AI systems (DeepBlue, for instance, is
confined to chess as a special problem). Moreover, typical GOFAI systems dispose at best
about an internal FRS (as DeepBlue does in terms of the functional roles of chess pieces).
AlphaGo, on the other hand, sits at a much higher position in the self-learning dimension,
we  then  arrive  at  AlphaGoZero  and  AlphaZero  by  successive  shifts  parallel  to  the
generalization axis. None of the mentioned systems, however, has a semantic grounding
beyond an internal FRS. At best, AI assistance systems such as Google Duplex move into
this dimension, albeit still weakly at present.
[Figure 1]
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It  would  be  desirable  to  proceed  from  the  state  space  topology  (dimensionality  and
neighborhood) to a metric space (to determine distances). Human-level AI (HAI) is a point
of orientation. HAI has values in all dimensions and can therefore be used to calibrate the
coordinate  axes.  In  addition,  systems  that  lie  on  the  extended  radial  connecting  line
between origin and HAI (or within a suitably chosen spatial angle range) mark the area of
superintelligence or superhuman AI (SAI) (see figure 2).
[Figure 2]
A detailed determination of the metric goes beyond the scope of this paper and is the task
of further investigations. Let us, instead, focus once again on the dimensionality. While the
three-dimensionality of the AI state space offers a first orientation, it is strictly speaking an
approximation in terms of a simplified dimensionality reduction. The point is that, on closer
inspection,  two  of  the  three  dimensions  decompose  into  further  subdimensions.  They
could be dubbed “main dimensions”, as they actually represent subspaces of the AI state
space. While the generalization dimension is already correctly identified, grounding is one
such main dimension that we will discuss in more detail below.
The dimension of  self-learning  needs some unpacking.  Self-learning  determines as  to
what extent an AI system can change its own configuration by means of self-organization.
There  are,  however,  further  dimensions  of  self-organization  that  are  crucial  for  the
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development  of  intelligence  and  cognition.  The  comparison  with  biological  intelligent
systems suggests self-repair and self-replication as additional dimensions. In general, we
should  exploit  the  so-called  self-x  qualities in  the  spirit  of the  program  of  organic
computing. The key idea of organic computing is that self-organization or self-organized
system configurations play a decisive role for AI (cf. Würtz 2008). Self-learning is only one
of  the  self-x  properties.  Depending  on  the  author,  the  self-x  properties  in  organic
computing  include  properties  like  self-learning,  self-configuring,  self-optimizing,  self-
healing or self-protecting. Some of these properties are not quite distinct (e.g. self-healing
and self-protecting), others are vaguely subsumed under self-configuring, although strictly
speaking all  self-x properties are properties of the configuration (from this perspective,
self-configuring and self-organizing are, as it were, “meta self-x properties”). Let us, as a
heuristic suggestion, consider the qualities
- self-learning,
- self-repairing,
- self-replicating.
Self-x properties in general represent the main dimension we are looking for, i.e. they span
the self-x subspace of the AI state space. An exhaustive identification of all relevant self-x
properties and a necessary analysis of the terms configuration and self-organization goes
beyond the scope of the current paper, but a somewhat anticipatory consideration should
nevertheless be added here. Our concern is not just about organic self-organization, but
about the most general self-x properties of any intelligent systems, whether artificial or
biological.  In this  sense, the concept  of  AI  just  includes natural  and especially  human
intelligence as special cases. It is therefore much more likely that further self-x properties
must be accounted for. Recall section 3.4, where it was argued that a Turing test on AGI
should include not only pure responsive but also practical skills, where the system is asked
to actively explore its environment. Let us therefore add the corresponding self-x property
to the above list:
- self-exploratory.
But even for Turing tests on AGI the black box problem essentially remains. In contrast, a
qualitatively new level would be reached if AI systems were able to provide explanations or
justifications  of  their  own responses  and  actions.  The  ability  of  being  self-explanatory
would add to the above as a further significant self-x feature. And this immediately raises
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the question of whether AI systems should not also be self-understanding or even self-
conscious. The list of self-x-properties may therefore be extended by the properties
- self-explanatory,
- self-understanding,
- self-conscious.
It  becomes clear  that  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  subspace of  self-x-ness leads to  far-
reaching questions that go considerably beyond the scope of the current paper. For our
purposes and as a main dimension, however, the self-x dimension of the AI state space is
sufficiently characterized.
Let us finally turn to the main dimension of grounding, and thus to the corresponding AI
subspace.  Our  discussion  in  section  3  has  shown  that  grounding,  understood  in  the
general sense of bearing semantics, can in principle occur in at least three ways. First, a
distinction must be made between an internal FRS and external semantics. Only the latter
establish  a  genuine  reference  relation  to  the  world.  As  two  important  candidates  we
considered referential semantics and use theories of meaning. Insofar as the semantic
properties of AI systems denoted by these three ways are to be regarded as independent,
the grounding dimension would be characterized by three subdimensions: functional role
grounding, referential grounding, and social grounding.
Also,  as  any  of  the  other  dimensions,  the  grounding  dimensions  are  understood  as
continuous dimensions. This is a further important point that can only be touched upon
here. Semantic grounding isn’t on-off. Intelligent systems, whether biological or artificial,
may be more or less grounded. The semantic skills of apes outweigh the skills of ravens,
which in turn outweigh the skills  of  ants.  The semantic skills pertain the way in which
intelligent beings are grounded or anchored in the world in terms of their meaningful grasp
and understanding of that world. Humans, in turn, trump the semantic skills of any known
animal. But the gradual differences in terms of grounding exist of course also within a
species. Healthy human adults overtop the semantic skills of newborns or patients with
dementia. Moreover, semantic grounding is open-ended. Future AI systems may likewise
outweigh the semantic skills of humans. The consequences of this are largely unknown
and speculative. This is one of the pressing questions and, presumably, big worries with
the issues of singularity and superintelligence (Bostrom 2013, Tegmark 2017).
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    [Figure 3]
The thus developed model of the state space of AI (see figure 3) is certainly only a first
draft. It remains to be examined whether further dimensions should be added or whether
postulated dimensions should be changed or deleted. The usefulness of a general model
of the state space of AI, however, is obvious. AI developments can be better classified and
related to one another by locating them in a state space. The future development could
also be taken more clearly into account. Indeed, not only the occupied regions of the state
space are of importance, but also those sectors that can possibly never be reached by any
AI are of fundamental interest. For example, it could very well turn out that there are no AI
systems that have a high degree of generalization but  are at the same time not  self-
learning or grounded to a certain extent. These and many other considerations are the
task of further research and exploration of the proposed state space of AI.
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